When a Stopgap Measure Triggers a Permanent Proscription: The Interpretation of “Committed to a Mental Institution” in the Gun Control Act of 1968 by Priest, Clare
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 80 Issue 1 
January 2002 
When a Stopgap Measure Triggers a Permanent Proscription: The 
Interpretation of “Committed to a Mental Institution” in the Gun 
Control Act of 1968 
Clare Priest 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Clare Priest, When a Stopgap Measure Triggers a Permanent Proscription: The Interpretation of 
“Committed to a Mental Institution” in the Gun Control Act of 1968, 80 WASH. U. L. Q. 359 (2002). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss1/7 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
359 
WHEN A STOPGAP MEASURE TRIGGERS 
A PERMANENT PROSCRIPTION: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF “COMMITTED TO  
A MENTAL INSTITUTION” IN THE GUN 
CONTROL ACT OF 1968 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Jane is a private bodyguard. One day, terrible tragedy strikes—her family 
is killed in a car accident. Jane is grief stricken when she hears the news. She 
collapses, crying, and asserts that her life is no longer worth living. Her 
sister, worried that Jane might be serious in her protestations and might 
indeed take her own life, calls a social worker. Jane’s sister explains that she 
is worried that Jane is suicidal. Jane protests that she is not actually suicidal, 
but the social worker asks a judge, in an ex parte  hearing, for an emergency 
order to detain Jane for observation in a mental hospital, under the state’s 
“Emergency Admission” statute.1 The judge signs the order because the 
social worker has probable cause to think that Jane is a danger to herself.2 
Without a hearing, an opportunity to testify, or a right to counsel, Jane is 
placed in the hospital against her will. Once the hospital admits Jane, a 
physician examines her. Because Jane is overwhelmed by anguish, the 
physician has reason to believe that Jane is a danger to herself.3 The next 
morning, a psychiatrist examines Jane and determines that Jane, though sad 
and shocked by the horrible events that befell her family, is not mentally ill 
and is not a danger to herself or to anyone else. The mental institution 
releases her.4  
 
 
 1. Under title 19, section 334-59(a)(2) of the Hawaii Revised Statute, for example, a judge can 
issue an ex parte emergency detention order upon the oral application of a clergy member, an attorney, 
“any state or county employee in the course of employment,” or a social service or health professional. 
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 334-59(a)(2) (Michie 2000). 
 2. Under Hawaii law, petitioners, in this hypothetical a social worker, must state that they have 
“probable cause to believe the person is mentally ill . . . [and] is imminently dangerous to self or 
others, or is gravely disabled, or is obviously ill, and in need of care or treatment.” § 344-59(a)(2). 
 3. Under the Hawaii statute, licensed physicians must examine patients upon their arrival at the 
treatment facility. § 334-59(b). If the examining physician “has reason to believe” that the person is 
“[m]entally ill . . . [and] immentently dangerous to self or others, or is, gravely disabled, or is 
obviously ill; and [i]n need of care or treatment . . .” then the physician may admit the patient. § 334-
59(d).  
 4. Under the Hawaii statut e, any time physicians decide that the patient does not meet the three 
criteria for emergency admission, they must release the patient. § 334-59(e). Facilities must release 
patients within forty-eight hours of admission unless the patients voluntarily admit themselves, or the 
state begins formal commitment proceedings. § 334-59(e). 
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After taking time off from work, Jane attempts to return to her job as a 
bodyguard. Federal agents arrest Jane when she places her gun in her holster, 
under the Gun Control Act of 1968 (the “Act”)5 for possessing a gun after 
having been “committed to a mental institution.”6 If Jane is in Louisiana, the 
court will dismiss the charges on the grounds that Jane was never actually 
“committed” and allow her to return to her job.7 If Jane is in Maine, the court 
will convict Jane under the Act and warn her that she must apply for 
discretionary relief from the Secretary of State  if she ever wishes to be a 
bodyguard again.8  
The Act makes it illegal for “any person . . . who has been adjudicated as 
a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution” to 
“possess . . . or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped 
or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.”9 Courts have disagreed on 
the test for determining what procedure constitutes commitment under the 
Act. Although courts agree that the commitment must be involuntary to 
trigger the Act,10 the circuits disagree as to whether a temporary involuntary 
 
 
 5. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (2000). Congress combined 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(d), 922(g), 922(h) and 
18 U.S.C. App. § 1202 into current § 922(g). United States v. Giardina, 861 F.2d 1334, 1335 n.1 (5th 
Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). 
 If Jane were a public employee, the Act would not prevent her from possessing firearms in her 
official capacity. See 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(1) (2000). 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(1) provides an exception to the 
Act for government units:  
(a)(1) The provisions of this chapter, except for sections 922(d)(9) and 922(g)(9) and provisions 
relating to firearms subject to the prohibitions of section 922(p), shall not apply with respect to the 
transportation, shipment, receipt, possession, or importation of any firearm or ammunition 
imported for, sold or shipped to, or issued for the use of, the United States or any department or 
agency thereof or any State or any department, agency, or political subdivision thereof. 
Id. Thus, § 925(a)(1) would permit a police officer in Jane’s situation to possess a firearm in her 
official capacity. 
 6. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (2000).  
 7. Cf. Giardina , 861 F.2d at 1337 (holding that an emergency commitment did not meet the 
formal commitment requirement of the Act). 
 8. Cf. United States v. Chamberlain, 159 F.3d 656, 664-65 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that the 
State’s commitment of the defendant without a hearing or representation by an attorney constituted 
commitment under the Act). 
 9. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (2000). 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) provides that: 
 (g) It shall be unlawful for any person-- 
 . . . .  
(4) who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental 
institution; 
. . . .  
to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any 
firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or 
transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 
Id. 
 10. See, e.g. , Chamberlain, 159 F.3d at 662 n.10, 663 (agreeing with district court that 
“‘commitment’ denotes involuntary action of some kind”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss1/7
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hospitalization without a formal hearing satisfies the Act’s commitment 
requirement.11 The Act does not define the term “committed” and there is 
little legislative history to help courts decipher the congressional intent. 
Courts diverge on two prongs of their analyses of the Act. First, although all 
courts have agreed that the interpretation of “committed” is a federal 
question, the courts differ on whether they should give deference to the 
state’s involuntary hospitalization laws.12 One group of courts defers to the 
state legislature that enacted the statute under which the patient was 
involuntarily hospitalized and examines the wording and nuances of that 
state statute.13 Another group of courts instead creates a federal definition of 
“committed” that is not informed by the state’s intent or word choice.14 
Second, courts differ in the interpretation of the congressional policy behind 
the Act.15 All courts agree, as the United States Supreme Court expressed in 
Huddleston v. United States,16 that Congress broadly intended to prevent 
dangerous people from possessing firearms.17 However, courts disagree on 
whether Congress only intended to prohibit gun possession by people whom 
a state had formally committed to a mental institution, or whether Congress 
broadly intended to prevent gun possession by anyone whom a state had 
placed involuntarily in a mental institution regardless of the patient’s 
opportunity for a hearing or the purpose of the confinement.18 As a result, 
there is no clear definition of what constitutes “commitment” under the Act.  
Part II of this Note provides both a brief overview of the concept of 
commitment and a history of how courts have dealt with interpreting the term 
 
 
 11. See, e.g., Chamberlain , 159 F.3d at 663-64 (stating that the interpretation of “committed” 
does not depend on state law and giving “committed” a broad reading that in cludes involuntary 
confinement without a hearing); United States v. Giardina, 861 F.2d 1334, 1336-37 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(deferring to the state legislature’s definition of “committed” and strictly construing the term 
“committed”). 
 12. Compare Giardina, 861 F.2d at 1336 (carefully examining Louisiana state law to determine 
if the defendant’s involuntary hospitalization was a commitment under Louisiana law), with 
Chamberlain , 159 F.3d at 662, 663 (explaining that the definition of commitment “should not turn 
primarily on the label attached by the state legislature to its procedures, but rather on the substance of 
those procedures” and that uniformity is one of the Act’s goals). 
 13. See, e.g., Giardina, 861 F.2d at 1336. 
 14. See, e.g., Chamberlain , 159 F.3d at 662-63. 
 15. See cases cited infra note 18. 
 16. 415 U.S. 814, 828 (1974). 
 17. See, e.g ., Chamberlain , 159 F.3d at 660. 
 18. Compare United States v. Hansel, 474 F.2d 1120, 1125 (8th Cir. 1973) (“If it is the desire of 
Congress to prohibit persons who have any history of mental illness from possessing guns, it can pass 
legislation to that effect, but we cannot read into this criminal statute an intent to do so.”), with 
Chamberlain , 159 F.3d at 664 (“In denying firearms to those ‘committed to a mental institution,’ 
Congress appears to have cast a wider net —to ‘maximize the possibility of keeping firearms out of the 
hands of’ [persons suffering from mental illness].”) (citation omitted). 
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“committed” for the purpose of the Act. Part III analyzes the different 
approaches that courts have taken to define the term “committed.” Part IV 
proposes how courts should interpret the Act and how Congress should 
redraft the Act to clarify its intentions and safeguard the rights of the 
mentally ill.  
II. OVERVIEW OF COMMITMENT 
A. Background 
1. Framework 
The American Bar Association (ABA) states that “[i]nvoluntary civil 
commitment is the process by which mentally ill individuals who are 
dangerous to themselves, others or property, or who are unable to care for 
their basic needs, are forced to receive mental health care, usually in an 
inpatient facility.”19 The process for commitment is different in each state, 
but generally, a third party petitions for the patient’s commitment, and then 
the patient, with legal counsel, attends a hearing before a judge, and 
sometimes a jury.20 
In the civil context, the state can hospitalize a person against his or her 
will through an observational or temporary commitment, an emergency 
commitment, or a “regular” or “final” commitment.21 Courts have usually 
 
 
 19. AMERICAN BAR ASS’N,  COMM’N ON THE MENTALLY DISABLED,  INVOLUNTARY  CIVIL 
COMMITMENT: A MANUAL FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES 3 (1988). The ABA explains: 
The principal purpose of civil commitment is treatment and protective isolation of the individual. 
Yet not all persons subjected to commitment procedures want to receive treatment, and many will 
refuse treatment provided in an institutional setting. Thus, the commitment process usually 
involves a tension between the rights and concerns of the individual subjected to the commitment 
petition, as represented by his/her lawyer, and the petitioner’s and state’s desire to provide 
treatment or isolation.  
Id. 
 20. See AMERICAN BAR ASS’N,  COMM’N ON THE MENTALLY DISABLED, supra note 19, at 3. 
The ABA explains that although each state has a unique civil commitment process, most have a 
common framework. Id. First, either a third person petitions the state to commit the individual, or the 
individual poses an immediate risk of danger. Id. Usually, the individual has the assistance of counsel 
at a commitment hearing; however, the lawyer generally has little or no preparation time. Id. The 
individual and the individual’s lawyer oppose the state’s attorney or the petitioner’s lawyer before a 
judge, and sometimes a jury. Id. The mental health professional at the institution where the individual 
has been or will be hospitalized is also present, sometimes with an independent mental health 
professional who has examined the individual for the court. Id. 
 21. MICHAEL L. PERLIN, LAW AND MENTAL DISABILITY  53 (1994). See also  BARBARA  A. 
WEINER & ROBERT M. WETTSTEIN, LEGAL ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH  CARE  44-47 (1993) (clearly 
distinguishing between “voluntary admission,” “informal admission,” “emergency admission,” 
“observational commitment,” and “civil commitment”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss1/7
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granted any due process protections for people that the state is involuntarily 
hospitalizing in the context of “regular” commitments.22 States require a 
lower standard of due process for involuntary emergency admission than for 
regular commitment: 
 Virtually all states have traditionally provided for some sort of 
commitment process to provide for the immediate apprehension and 
detention of persons in need of emergency commitment. The process 
is typically begun by the issuance of a warrant, based on allegations 
by a police officer, certified mental health professional, family 
member, or, in some cases, “any responsible person,” that a person is 
reasonably believed to be imminently dangerous to himself or others. 
 Empirical studies tend to reveal that in many cases in which such 
statutes are used, “no real emergency exists.” Because emergency 
procedures involve “a minimum of red tape and provide the quickest, 
easiest way to get a person to a hospital,” they have often been used as 
the standard means of institutionalization, especially in areas without 
readily available (or cooperating) physicians.23 
The state’s power to confine a person involuntarily to a mental hospital 
comes from parens patriae authority, meaning “parent of the country,” and 
the state’s police power.24 Parens patriae requires the government to protect 
the members of society who cannot protect themselves, such as minors and 
the mentally ill.25 The government has the authority to commit a mentally ill 
person in order to provide treatment when that individual does not have the 
ability to make rational choices for himself.26 Under parens patriae, the state 
 
 
 22. See generally, PERLIN, supra  note 21, at 58-136. 
 23. PERLIN, supra  note 21, at 152-53 (footnotes omitted). For a critique of Massachusetts’s 
emergency involuntary civil commitment statute, see generally Marybeth Walsh, Note, Due Process 
Requirements for Emergency Civil Commitments: Safeguarding Patients’ Liberty Without 
Jeopardizing Health and Safety, 40 B.C. L. REV. 673 (1999). For an example of how a third party 
could use an emergency involuntary hospitalization procedure that required minimum “red tape” 
maliciously, see Rent v. State, 949 S.W.2d 418 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Rent requested that a probate 
judge approve an emergency detention of Rent’s ex-wife, because he claimed that he was afraid of her 
and that she was acting strangely, was not accepting reality, and had been violent before. Id. at 419. On 
the basis of Rent’s statement alone, the judge issued a warrant for Rent’s ex-wife’s immediate 
detention. Id. The police officer went to her home, found her eating “a normal family dinner,” and took 
her to the hospital. Id. A second-year psychiatric resident examined her and admitted her. Id. The next 
morning, a psychiatrist examined her, determined that she did not need treatment and that Rent had 
falsely caused her to be hospitalized, and released her. Id. A jury convicted Rent of intentionally 
causing an unwarranted commitment. Id. at 418. 
 24. WEINER & WETTSTEIN, supra  note 21, at 47. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id.  
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p359  Priest book pages.doc  8/5/2002   5:52 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
364 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 80:359 
 
 
 
 
has the power to commit a mentally ill person who is “unable to care for 
himself” or who is “dangerous to himself.”27 The second source of the state’s 
power to commit a person is the state’s police power.28 The state has the 
authority to act for the public’s safety and welfare. In order to protect society, 
the state has the power to confine those who pose a danger to society, for 
example, a mentally ill person who is dangerous to others.29  
2. Due Process Requirements and Commitment  
Since 1816, some states have granted extensive due process rights to 
individuals in incompetency proceedings, including the right to counsel.30 
Today, all states require that the state notify the disabled person of the state’s 
intent to commit her.31 Most states require a hearing32 and make the patient’s 
presence at the hearing mandatory.33 Although the Supreme Court has never 
explicitly defined which due process rights are mandatory for patients who 
are subject to involuntary civil commitment, the Court has clearly stated that 
 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. For a discussion of the inaccuracy of mental health professionals’ predictions of violence, 
see generally Donald N. Bersoff, Judicial Deference to Nonlegal Decisionmakers: Imposing Simplistic 
Solutions on Problems of Cognitive Complexity in Mental Disability Law, 46 SMU L. REV. 329, 355-
57 (1992).  
 For an argument in favor of the parens patriae power and against the police power as justification 
for involuntary civil commitment, see Donald H. J. Hermann, Barriers to Providing Effective 
Treatment: A Critique of Revisions in Procedural, Substantive, and Dispositional Criteria in 
Involuntary Civil Commitment, 39 VAND. L. REV. 83 (1986). The author sees a trend of states relying 
solely on their police power to commit individuals, and thus requiring mental health professionals to 
make a prediction of future dangerousness before committing a person, as unfortunate. Id. at 97. He 
argues that this trend fails to recognize that mental illness can be incapacitating even when it is not 
causing a person to be dangerous. Id. Dangerousness alone is a defective standard because mental 
health professionals are unable to accurately predict dangerousness, or to treat it. Id. at 98. He 
maintains that states return to their parens patriae power and allow involuntary civil commitment of 
any person who is in need of mental health treatment but, because he or she is mentally ill, is unable to 
rationally decide if he or she needs treatment. Id. at 100. 
 30. WEINER & WETTSTEIN, supra note 21, at 42. For a discussion of the importance of the right 
to counsel in a commitment proceeding, see id. at 56. The authors argue that the right to counsel might 
be a person’s paramount right at a commitment proceeding. Id. Counsel safeguards the person’s rights, 
challenges the state’s case, and advocates for the client. Id. The authors note that “[w]ith few 
exceptions, state statutes specifically provide that a person is entitled to representation when civil 
commitment is sought.” Id.  
 31. Id. at 55. 
 32. As of 1988, all states except Colorado, Maryland, Nebraska, New York, and South Dakota, 
required a mandatory hearing for civil commitment unless the defendant waived the hearing. See 
AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, COMM’N ON THE MENTALLY DISABLED, supra  note 19, app. at 102-06 tbl.5. 
Colorado required a hearing at the defendant’s written request. Id. 
 33. WEINER & WETTSTEIN, supra  note 21, at 56. 
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Fourteenth Amendment due process rights do apply34 and that commitment 
is a serious procedure with serious consequences.35  
In Addington v. Texas,36 the Supreme Court used the term “civil 
commitment proceeding” to refer to a procedure that would result in an 
individual “being involuntarily confined indefinitely.”37 Thus, the Court did 
not include temporary and emergency “commitments” in its definition of 
“civil commitment.” The Court emphasized the “significant deprivation of 
liberty” that results from commitment and the “stigma” that commitment can 
impose on a person.38 It explained the importance of carefully determining 
that a person has a medical need for commitment and is not simply exhibiting 
“abnormal” or “idiosyncratic behavior.”39 The Court underscored the 
“weight and gravity” of a person’s interest in the consequences of 
 
 
 34. In Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967), the Supreme Court addressed Colorado’s Sex 
Offenders Act and held that “commitment proceedings whether denominated civil or criminal are 
subject . . . to the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 608. For an early example of the Supreme Court’s notice 
that states must use special care to preserve the due process rights of those the state attempts to 
commit, see Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940):  
We fully recognize the danger of a deprivation of due process in proceedings dealing with persons 
charged with insanity or, as here, with a psychopathic personality as defined in the statute, and the 
special importance of maintaining the basic interests of liberty in a class of cases where the law 
though “fair on its face and impartial in appearance” may be open to serious abuses in 
administration and courts may be imposed upon if the substantial rights of the persons charged are 
not adequately safeguarde d at every stage of the proceedings.  
Id. at 276-77. 
 35. O’Connor v. Donaldson , 422 U.S. 563 (1975), involved a nondangerous civilly committed 
patient who the hospital refused to release for fifteen years. Id. at 608. The Supreme Court emphasized 
the high stakes involved in a commitment proceeding: “As we view it, this case raises a single, 
relatively simple, but nonetheless important question concerning every man’s constitutional right to 
liberty.” Id. at 573. The Court further explained: 
 A finding of “mental illness” alone cannot justify a State’s locking a person up against his 
will and keeping him indefinitely in simple custodial confinement. Assuming that that term can be 
given a reasonably precise content and that the “mentally ill” can be identified with reasonable 
accuracy, there is still no constitutional basis for confining such persons involuntarily if they are 
dangerous to no one and can live safely in freedom.  
Id. at 575. 
 36. 441 U.S. 418 (1979). 
 37. Id. at 425. The Court wrote: “In considering what standard should govern in a civil 
commitment proceeding, we must assess both the extent of the individual’s interest in not being 
involuntarily confined indefinitely and the state’s interest in committing the emotionally disturbed 
under a particular standard of proof.” Id. 
 38. Id. at 425-26.  
 39. Id. at 426-27. The Court warned that at some point in everyone’s life, one exhibits strange 
behavior, “which might be perceived by some as symptomatic of a mental or emotional disorder, but 
which is in fact within a range of conduct that is generally acceptable.” Id. This strange conduct does 
not justify forced treatment or confinement. Id. at 427. But, the Court cautioned, a factfinder might 
mistakenly commit a person on the basis of “a few isolated instances of unusual conduct.” Id. The 
Court reasoned that it had to set the burden of proof in such a way as to underscore the significance of 
the commitment decision and to protect persons whose behavior is merely eccentric from improper 
commitments. Id. 
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involuntary commitment.40  
Giving detail to the Supreme Court’s broad affirmation of general due 
process rights, various district courts have held that patients have a right to 
counsel before commitment.41 A significant majority of courts have held that 
under state law, persons have a constitutional right to an attorney at a civil 
commitment hearing.42 In Heryford v. Parker,43 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that patients had a constitutional right to 
counsel in a commitment proceeding.44 The court relied on the Supreme 
Court’s holding in In re Gault,45 which held that a youth had a right to 
counsel in a delinquency proceeding because of the “awesome prospect of 
incarceration in a state institution.”46 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that 
whenever the state seeks to involuntarily confine a person, due process rights 
apply.47 When the state relies on its parens patriae role of caring for the 
individual, then the state “has the inescapable duty to vouchsafe due 
process.”48   
 
 
 40. Id. at 427. For further explanation of the grave consequences of commitment, see AMERICAN 
BAR ASS’N, COMM’N ON THE MENTALLY DISABLED, supra note 19, at 3. The commission explained:  
 The result of the civil commitment process is a massive deprivation of liberty. Individuals 
who are committed to inpatient facilities lose their freedom of movement, freedom of choice and 
often are given medication that may have serious side effects . . . . A well-run civil commitment 
process should ensure that respondents are placed in the least restrictive setting consistent with 
their needs.  
Id.  
 41. See, e.g., Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 389 (M.D. Ala. 1974), rev’d, 651 F.2d 387 (5th 
Cir. 1981); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1099 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded , 
414 U.S. 473 (1974), reinstated 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976). The Supreme Court has not ruled 
that indigent defendants have a right to appointed counsel for civil commitment proceedings. In a 
related case, Vitek v. Jones, the Court held that a state must provide a prisoner with “qualified and 
independent assistance” before committing him or her to a mental institution. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 
480, 497 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).  
 42. AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, COMM’N ON THE MENTALLY DISABLED, supra  note 19, at 12. 
 43. 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968). 
 44. Id. at 396. 
 45. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 46. Heryford , 396 F.2d at 395 (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 36-37). 
 47. Id. at 396. 
 48. Id. Scholars argue that in addition to the constitutional justification for due process rights in 
commitment proceedings, a desire for the correct outcome and for the individual who is taking part in 
the process to obey society’s laws requires that the government follow due process safeguards in 
commitment proceedings. See Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological Consequences of Judicial 
Procedures: Implications for Civil Commitment Hearings, 46 SMU L. REV. 433 (1992). The author 
argues that due process safeguards are vital in the civil commitment process not only because they 
ensure a more accurate outcome, but also because they have a positive psychological effect on the 
individual being committed. Id. at 445. Individuals who perceive their commitment proceeding to be 
fair will be more likely to accept and obey authority and follow society’s rules. Id. at 443. He argues 
that this respect for societal authority is in fact one of the goals of the proceeding itself. Id. at 443-44.  
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B. Statutory Construction 
Because the Act does not define “committed,” courts must look elsewhere 
to interpret the term. One tool courts use is statutory construction. Each 
court’s method of statutory construction affects its interpretation of the term. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit drew on the rule of 
lenity when it reasoned that “committed” requires a formal civil 
commitment.49 The rule of lenity requires that when an act is penal, it should 
be strictly construed and any ambiguities should be construed in favor of the 
defendant.50 A corollary to the rule of lenity is that interpretations of 
ambiguous phrases in statutes should be informed by the professionals who 
are involved in that field,51 by the way the term is actually used in practice,52 
and by the people who are affected by the statute.53 The Supreme Court 
recently reaffirmed the validity of the long-standing54 rule of lenity in Jones 
v. United States.55  
Courts utilize the rule of lenity to prevent overly “expansive judicial 
interpretations [that] will create penalties not originally intended by the 
legislature” when legislative intent is ambiguous.56 The justifications for the 
 
 
 49. United States v. Giardina, 861 F.2d 1334, 1337 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 50. 2B NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY  CONSTRUCTION § 59.03, at 102 (rev. 
5th ed. 1992). 
 51. 2B NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 49:03, at 14-17 (West 
Group 6th ed. 2000). Singer explains: “Long-continued contemporaneous and practical interpretation 
of a statute by the executive officers charged with its administration and enforcement, the courts and 
the public constitute an invaluable aid in determining the meaning of a doubtful statute.” Id. (footnote 
omitted).  
 52. Id. § 49:03, at 17. The author notes: 
This rule of construction is closely related to the doctrine that statutes will be given their common 
and ordinary meaning, but such meaning must be justified through resort to extrinsic sources 
which relate to the operation of the statue in actual practice. In addition, the use of contemporary 
and practical interpretation provides certainty in the law and justifies reliance upon the conduct of 
public officials.  
Id. (footnotes omitted).  
 53. Id. § 49:06, at 94. Singer explains: “The meaning attached by people affected by an act may 
have an important bearing on how it is construed.” Id. (footnote omitted). 
 54. Id. Singer states: “It is an ancient rule of statutory construction that penal statutes should be 
strictly construed against the government or parties seeking to enforce statutory penalties and in favor 
of the persons on whom penalties are sought to be imposed.” Id. 
 55. 529 U.S. 848, 912 (2000). The Court explained: 
We have instructed that “ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved 
in favor of lenity,” and that “when choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct 
Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require 
that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 56. SINGER,  supra  note 50, at § 59.03, at 102. The rule of lenity is a tool designed to ascertain 
Congress’s intent, so it applies only when there is no clear congressional intent otherwise apparent. Id. 
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rule of lenity include the reasoning that the defendant did not cause the 
ambiguity in the statute,57 that, to ensure fairness, people ought to have 
“clear” notice of what type of actions are punishable,58 and that the individual 
must be protected “against arbitrary discretion by officials and judges.”59  
The Supreme Court applied the rule of lenity to another section of the 
Gun Control Act of 1968 in the landmark case United States v. Bass.60 Later, 
in Simpson v. United States61 the Court again applied the rule of lenity to the 
Gun Control Act of 1968.62 
 
 
 57. Id. § 59.03, at 103. 
 58. Id. § 59.03, at 102-03. 
 59. Id. § 59.03, at 103 (footnote omitted). According to one commentator, the rule of lenity is 
especially applicable to this Act. See Robert Batey, Techniques of Strict Construction: The Supreme 
Court and the Gun Control Act of 1968 , 13 AM. J. CRIM. L. 123, 137 (1986) [hereinafter Batey, 
Techniques] (warning of the danger of a complex statute encouraging authorities to make arbitrary 
decisions); Robert Batey, Strict Construction of Firearms Offenses: The Supreme Court and the Gun 
Control Act of 1968 , 49 LAW &  CONTEMP. PROBS. 163, 165 (1986) [hereinafter Batey, Firearms 
Offenses] (explaining that society has used gun control laws as a means of discrimination). For further 
discussion of Batey’s articles, see infra  notes 197-99 and accompanying text. 
 60. 404 U.S. 336 (1971), cited in  Batey, Techniques, supra  note 59, at  137-38. The Court 
explained: 
 First, as we have recently reaffirmed, “ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes 
should be resolved in favor of lenity.” In various ways over the years, we have stated that “when 
choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is 
appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken 
in language that is clear and definite.”  
Id. at 347 (citations omitted). 
 The Court championed the rule of lenity based on two grounds. First, the rule of lenity ensures 
that the people who must obey the law are given notice of the law. Id. at 348. The law should be clear 
so that people are able to understand it and follow it. Id. Second, the rule of lenity ensures that the 
courts allow legislatures to define criminal conduct. Id. The Court reasoned that criminal statutes are 
especially important because they carry grave punishments and because a criminal conviction “usually 
represents the moral condemnation of the community.” Id. Because the consequences are severe when 
a legislature criminalizes an activity, the lawmaker has a responsibility to clearly define its intent. Id. 
The Court concluded that if the lawmaker is unclear, because of the harsh consequence of conviction, 
the courts must decide ambiguity in the defendant’s favor. Id. In Bass, the Court determined that 
“Congress has not ‘plainly and unmistakably,’ made it a federal crime for a convicted felon simply to 
possess a gun absent some demonstrated nexus with interstate commerce.” Id. at 348-49 (citations 
omitted). 
 61. 435 U.S. 6 (1978). 
 62. Id. at 14, cited in  Batey, Techniques, supra note 59, at 149. In Simpson, the defendants were 
twice convicted of committing armed robbery. Id. at 8-9. At both trials, the court enhanced their 
sentences under 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 2113(d). Id. at 9. Both sections provided for enhanced 
sentences for defendants who used firearms when committing a federal felony. Id. at 10. The Court 
reasoned that Congress’s intent to allow both sections to provide cumulative sentence enhancement 
was unclear, and, in fact, one piece of legislative history favored the defendant. Id. at 15. The Court 
reaffirmed its adherence to the rule of lenity and explained that it would resolve statutory ambiguity in 
favor of the defendant. Id. at 14. The Court’s interpretation of the statute was superceded by the 1984 
amendment of 18 U.S.C. § 924. United States v. Holloway, 905 F.2d 893, 894 (5th Cir. 1990). 
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C. Legislative History of the Act 
Although there is extensive legislative history for the Gun Control Act of 
1968, there is sparse history on the § 922(g)(4) prohibition against gun 
possession by a person whom the state “has . . . committed to a mental 
institution.”63 A conference report on the bill64 demonstrated, however, that 
Congress intended the prohibition to apply only to those persons whom the 
state had formally committed.65 The various speeches by representatives 
showed a clear intent to keep guns away from people who are dangerous 
because of their mental illness,66 but Congress did not discuss the definition 
of commitment. The metamorphosis of the statutory language documented in 
the conference report demonstrated Congress’s intention in its final word 
choice. In the original House bill, persons whom the state had “committed 
under a court order to a mental institution” could not buy a firearm.67 The 
Senate version of the bill omitted the requirement of a court order.68 The 
conference adopted the Senate language, not requiring a court order 
“inasmuch as mental boards and commissions constitute[d] the adjudicating 
or committing authority in some jurisdictions.”69 The conference version of 
the Act retained the meaning of the original House version of the bill, 
requiring a formal—court ordered—commitment, with the added narrow 
exception that when commissions or mental boards play the same role as a 
court in a formal commitment in a state, a commission or board ordered 
formal commitment would be sufficient.70 
 
 
 63. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (2000). 
 64. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 90-1956 (1968), reprinted in  1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4426, 4429-30. The 
House managers’ conference report on the bill reads, in relevant part: 
 Under the House bill sales or other dispositions of firearms or ammunition to the following 
were prohibited: . . . (4) a person adjudicated in any court as a mental defective or committed 
under a court order to a mental institution.  
 . . .   
 Under the Senate amendment no prohibition was placed on sales or other dispositions . . . 
involving . . . mental defectives, or committed persons.  
 . . .  
 The conference substitute adopts the broader restrictions provided in the House bill and in the 
case of mental defectiv es and committed persons does not require that there be prior action by a 
court inasmuch as mental boards and commissions constitute the adjudicating or committing 
authority in some jurisdictions.  
Id. 
 65. Id.  
 66. See infra  notes 71-78 and accompanying text. 
 67. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 90-1956 (1968), reprinted in  1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4426, 4429-30. 
 68. Id., reprinted at 4430. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See id.  
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During speeches on the House floor, representatives stated their intention 
to keep guns away from “persons with records of mental instability,”71 “the 
mentally unstable,”72 people who are not “capable of using [guns] safely and 
legitimately,”73 “mental incompetents,”74 “the insane,”75 “mental 
incompetents . . . and other irresponsibles,”76 and “mentally irresponsible 
persons.”77 One representative explained that “[t]his bill seeks to maximize 
the possibility of keeping firearms out of the hands of [‘mental incompetents’ 
[and] ‘persons with a history of mental disturbances’].”78 
D. Regulatory Definition 
In 1997, the Department of the Treasury, which includes the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, adopted regulations defining the phrases 
“adjudicated as a mental defective” and “committed to a mental institution” 
under the Act.79  
The Treasury interprets “committed to a mental institution” as:  
A formal commitment of a person to a mental institution by a court, 
board, commission, or other lawful authority. The term includes a 
commitment to a mental institution involuntarily. The term includes 
commitment for mental defectiveness or mental illness. It also 
includes commitments for other reasons, such as for drug use. The 
term does not include a person in a mental institution for observation 
or a voluntary admission to a mental institution.80 
 
 
 71. 114 CONG. REC. 22,270 (1968) (statement of Rep. Fino).  
 72. Id.  
 73. Id. (statement of Rep. Cohelan). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 21,834 (statement of Rep. Gallagher). 
 76. Id. at 21,832 (statement of Rep. Corman). 
 77. Id. at 21,780 (statement of Rep. Sikes). 
 78. Id. at 21,784 (statement of Rep. Celler). 
 79. 27 C.F.R. § 178.11 (2000). 
 80. Id. The regulations define “adjudicated as a mental defective” as follows: 
(a) A determination by a court, board, commission, or other lawful authority that a person, as a 
result of marked subnormal intelligence, or mental illness, incompetency, condition, or disease: 
(1) Is a danger to himself or to others; or 
(2) Lacks the mental capacity to contract or manage his own affairs. 
(b) The term shall include— 
(1) A finding of insanity by a court in a criminal case; and 
(2) Those persons found incompetent to stand trial or found not guilty by reason of lack of mental 
responsibility pursuant to articles 50a and 72b of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. 
850a, 876b.  
27 C.F.R. § 178.11 (2000). 
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The regulations clearly require a “formal commitment” and expressly state 
that involuntary confinement for “observation” is not sufficient.81  
E. Supreme Court Interpretations of the Purpose of the Act 
The Supreme Court has never addressed the meaning of “committed” 
under the Act; however, the Court has explored the general congressional 
intent behind the Gun Control Act of 1968. In Barrett v. United States,82 the 
Court inferred that the Gun Control Act’s structure revealed a broad 
congressional intent to keep guns away from “potentially irresponsible and 
dangerous” individuals.83 In Huddleston v. United States,84 the Court 
explained that “[t]he principal purpose of the federal gun control legislation 
. . . was to curb crime by keeping ‘firearms out of the hands of those not 
legally entitled to possess them because of age, criminal background, or 
incompetency.’”85 Furthermore, the Court quoted the following 
congressional statement: “No one can dispute the need to prevent drug 
addicts, mental incompetents, persons with a history of mental disturbances, 
and persons convicted of certain offenses, from buying, owning, or 
possessing firearms. This bill seeks to maximize the possibility of keeping 
firearms out of the hands of such persons.”86 The Court reiterated the rule of 
lenity but warned that clear congressional intent trumped overly strict 
construction.87  
F. Federal Courts: Commitment Under the Act 
Defendants have attacked their convictions under the Act on the grounds 
that their previous involuntary confinement to a mental institution, on which 
the conviction was based, was not a commitment within the meaning of the 
Act.88 Other bases for attacking convictions under § 922(g)(4), such as 
subsequent cure of the danger and equal protection under the Fifth 
Amendment, have failed.89  
 
 
 81. Id.  
 82. 423 U.S. 212 (1976). 
 83. Id. at 218. 
 84. 415 U.S. 814 (1974). 
 85. Id. at 824 (citations omitted). 
 86. Id. at 828 (quoting 114 CONG. REC. 21,784 (1968) (statement of Rep. Celler)). 
 87. Id. at 831. 
 88. See, e.g., United States v. Hansel, 474 F.2d 1120, 1122 (8th Cir. 1973). 
 89. See Dickerson v. New Banner Inst. Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 116 (1983). In Dickerson, the 
Supreme Court clearly stated that the present condition of a formerly mentally ill individual is 
irrelevant under the Act: 
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Throughout the history of the Act courts have used a two-part analysis to 
determine whether a defendant has been committed within the meaning of 
the Act.90 First, courts determine how much deference to give to the language 
of the state law in determining whether a particular state procedure 
constituted a commitment under the Act.91 Second, courts examine the 
congressional policy behind the Act to determine if the outcome under the 
first part of the analysis comports with that policy.92 The first group of courts 
of appeals decisions after the passage of the Act that addressed the issue of 
the definition of commitment under the Act deferred to state law.93 In recent 
years, however, courts of appeals have shifted the focus away from state law 
 
 
A person adjudicated as a mental defective may later be adjudged competent, and a person 
committed to a mental institution later may be deemed cured and released. Yet Congress made no 
exception for subsequent curative events. The past adjudication or commitment disqualifies. 
Congress obviously felt that such a person, though unfortunate, was too much of a risk to be 
allowed firearms privileges.  
Id. 
 See also  United States v. Jones, 569 F. Supp. 395 (D.S.C. 1983). In Jones, the defendant argued 
that the classification of persons who have been committed to a mental institution under § 922(h)(4) 
(now incorporated into § 922(g)(4)) of the Act violated equal protection under the Fifth Amendment of 
the Constitution because “it create[d] an invidious discrimination against all persons who have been 
‘committed to any mental institution’ regardless of their present mental status and without any rational 
basis.” Id. at 396. The defendant also asserted “that persons within that classification [were] punished 
due to their status.” Id. at 398. The court responded that the receipt of firearm  by a person of such 
classification constituted a violation of the statute rather than the classification itself.  Id. (citation 
omitted). The court reasoned that “there is no absolute constitutional right of an individual to possess a 
firearm.” Id. (citations omitted). Thus, “the test of determining the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(h)(4) depends on finding a rational basis for the particular classification. It is presumed that 
legislatures act advisedly and with adequate knowledge of existing conditions sought to be corrected 
by the legislation and that the legislative action is not arbitrary or unreasonable.” Id. (citations 
omitted). The court held that the classification was not “irrational, when considered in light of the 
Congressional intent to keep firearms away from persons considered as potentially irresponsible and 
dangerous.” Id. at 399.  
 90. See, e.g., United States v. Giardina, 861 F.2d 1334, 1335 (5th Cir. 1988) (“Was [the 
defendant] committed under Louisiana law? If he was not, is that answer consistent with federal 
policy?”). 
 91. Compare Giardina, 861 F.2d at 1336 (carefully examining Louisiana state law to determine 
if the defendant’s involuntary hospitalization was a commitment under Louisiana law), with United 
States v. Chamberlain, 159 F.3d 656, 662-63 (1st Cir. 1998) (explaining that uniformity is one of the 
Act’s goals and that the definition of commitment “should not turn primarily on the label attached by 
the state legislature to it s procedures, but rather on the substance of those procedures”). 
 92. Compare Hansel, 474 F.2d at 1125 (“If it is the desire of Congress to prohibit persons who 
have any history of mental illness from possessing guns, it can pass legislation to that effect, but we 
cannot read into this criminal statute an intent to do so.”), with  Chamberlain , 159 F.3d at 664 (“In 
denying firearms to those ‘committed to a mental institution,’ Congress appears to have cast a wider 
net —to ‘maximize the possibility of keeping firearms out of the hands of [persons suffering from 
mental illness].’”) (citation omitted). 
 93. See, e.g., Hansel, 474 F.2d at 1122; Giardina, 861 F.2d at 1335. 
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and rule of lenity construction, and instead have sought to create a broad 
federal definition of commitment.94  
1. Deference to State Law 
In United States v. Hansel,95 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit looked to the language of the state involuntary hospitalization 
statute and to congressional policy to determine that an observational 
hospitalization was not a commitment within the meaning of § 922(g)(4).96 
The county health board involuntarily hospitalized the defendant, Hansel.97 
Upon Hansel’s admission, a doctor examined Hansel and decided that he did 
not “have a serious mental disorder, . . . [did not] need . . . hospitalization[,] 
. . . [and] was not a mental defective.”98 After his release, Hansel received a 
firearm and, during the transaction, certified that he had not violated the 
Act.99 The government charged Hansel with violating the Act by receiving a 
gun after having been committed to a mental institution. 100 The Eighth 
Circuit held that Nebraska had not committed Hansel to the hospital, but 
rather it had admitted him for “observation.”101  
To decide whether Hansel had been committed, the court examined the 
language of Nebraska’s involuntary hospitalization statute.102 Nebraska had a 
two-part system for involuntary hospitalization. 103 First, the state could have 
the patient “temporarily hospitalized for psychiatric observation” under the 
direction of the County Mental Health Board.104 Second, the state could have 
the individual “committed” upon certification to the Board by the hospital 
superintendent.105 In Hansel’s case the state failed to comply with the second 
step. In fact, the superintendent decided that Hansel had “no serious mental 
 
 
 94. See Chamberlain , 159 F.3d at 662; United States v. Midgett, 198 F.3d 143, 146 (4th Cir. 
1999). 
 95. 474 F.2d 1120 (8th Cir. 1973). 
 96. Id. at 1122-23. 
 97. Id. at 1122. The state hospitalized Hansel pursuant to 5 NEB.  REV. STAT.  § 83-328 (1971) 
(now repealed). 
 98. 474 F.2d at 1122. 
 99. Id. at 1121. 
 100. United States v. Hansel, 474 F.2d 1120, 1121 (8th Cir. 1973). The government charged 
Hansel under 18 U.S.C. § 922(h), which Congress later incorporated into § 922(g). See supra note 5. It 
also charged him with violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(6) and 924(a) for making the false 
certification on an application for firearms. 474 F.2d at 1122. 
 101. Id. at 1123. 
 102. Id. at 1123 (citing 5 NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-328 (1971)).  
 103. Id.  
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
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illness” and that the state did not need to hospitalize him. 106 Under the 
language of the Nebraska statute, the state had “authoriz[ed] the 
superintendent . . . to receive and keep [Hansel] . . . for a period of 
observation,” but the state had not “committed” him.107 The court reasoned 
that Congress only intended to prohibit firearm possession by persons that 
the state had “committed,” not by those merely “hospitalized for observation 
and examination.”108 
The court also held that Hansel had not been adjudged a mental defective 
under 18 U.S.C. § 922(h), because the term “mental defective” refers to 
people who are mentally retarded, not to the mentally ill.109 The court 
reasoned that sometimes “mental defective” is defined more expansively, but 
because the court had to “construe the statute narrowly,” it chose to give 
“mental defective” its ordinary meaning.110 
Fifteen years after the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Hansel, in United States 
v. Giardina,111 the Fifth Circuit agreed that the Act must be strictly construed 
 
 
 106. United States v. Hansel, 474 F.2d 1120, 1123 (8th Cir. 1973). 
 107. Id. (quoting 5 NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-328 (1971)). 
 108. Id. The court reasoned: 
If it is the desire of Congress to prohibit persons who have any history of mental illness from 
possessing guns, it can pass legislation to that effect, but we cannot read into this criminal statute 
an intent to do so. We can speculate that Congress desired to keep guns from all who had a history 
of mental illness and we might agree that such a policy would be desirable; but we can find no 
support for such a holding on our part. 
Id. at 1125. 
 109. Id. at 1124. 
 110. Id. at 1125. For a discussion of the rule of lenity, see supra Part I.B. 
 In 1995 the Eighth Circuit again took up the meaning of “committed” in United States v. Whiton , 
48 F.3d 356 (8th Cir. 1995). In 1990, defendant Whiton was “involuntarily admitted” to a hospital 
because he “was exhibiting bizarre behavior.” Id. at 357. Six days after Whiton’s admission, a Texas 
judge found Whiton mentally ill and committed him for a span of up to ninety days based on 
“certificates of medical examination from two psychologists who had examined Whiton.” Id. “After 
determining that Whiton was capable of participating in outpatient therapy, the Hospital discharged 
him” fifteen days later. Id. In 1993, Whiton purchased a rifle and stated on the Alcohol, Tobacco, and 
Firearms Form 4473 that “he had never been committed to a mental institution.” Id. A trial court 
convicted Whiton of violating the Act. Id.  
 The court reasoned that although the interpretation of “committed” was a question of federal law, 
the court should look to the state law for guidance because the hospitalization occurred under state 
law. Id. at 358. The court quickly resolved the question, reasoning that Whiton was involuntarily 
hospitalized under a Texas law that used the term “committed” and thus was committed under Texas 
law after a hearing. Id. 
 The court then explained that Whiton’s treatment under § 922(g)(4) was not unconstitutional 
under either the equal protection clause or the substantive due process clause of the United States 
Constitution. Id. The court reasoned that Whiton was not “similarly situated to those persons who 
allegedly received favorable treatments,” specifically, the defendants in Hansel and Giardina. Id. The 
court reasoned that “[u]nlike Whiton, the defendants in both of those cases were neither adjudicated to 
be mentally ill nor were they ordered to be committed to a mental institution.” Id. 
 111. 861 F.2d 1334 (5th Cir. 1988). 
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and required formal commitment.112 In 1984, Louisiana “admitted and 
detained [defendant, Giardina] . . . under an emergency certificate.”113 The 
state held Giardina for two weeks and then released him.114 Three years later, 
Giardina twice purchased a gun and signed Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms 
Form 4473, stating that he had never been committed to a mental 
institution. 115 The Fifth Circuit held that Giardina had not been committed 
under meaning of the Act and vacated his conviction.116  
The court noted that the Act does not define the term “committed” and 
that there was no binding precedent on point.117 Although the definition of 
the term was a question of federal law,118 the Fifth Circuit reasoned that it 
could “seek guidance from state law.”119 
To determine whether the state had committed Giardina within the 
meaning of the Louisiana law, the court undertook a detailed examination of 
the evolution of the language of Louisiana’s involuntary hospitalization 
statute.120 In response to a Louisiana state court decision,121 the Louisiana 
legislature had “conspicuously” eliminated the terms “committed” and 
“commitment” from its involuntary hospitalization statute except when 
referring to a “formal judicial commitment.”122 The state had hospitalized 
Giardina under its admission by emergency certificate procedure.123 The 
court reasoned that because the state legislature had consciously chosen to 
name that procedure an admission, not a commitment, an emergency 
admission was not a commitment under Louisiana law.124 Unless such a 
conclusion was inconsistent with federal policy, Giardina had not violated 
the Act.125  
In the second half of its opinion, the court examined the congressional 
 
 
 112. Id. at 1337. 
 113. Id. at 1336 (citing LA. REV. STAT. § 28:53 (1985)). 
 114. 861 F.2d at 1334. 
 115. Id. at 1334. 
 116. Id. at 1337. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 1335. The court looked to a Supreme Court case interpreting another term in § 922, 
Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc. 460 U.S. 103 (1983). In Dickerson, the Court reasoned that 
“[w]hether one has been ‘convicted’ within the language of the gun control statutes is necessarily . . . a 
question of federal, not state, law, despite the fact that the predicate offense and its punishment are 
defined by the law of the State.” Id. at 111-12, quoted in Giardina, 861 F.2d at 1335. 
 119. Giardina , 861 F.2d at 1335. 
 120. Id. at 1336. 
 121. Burns v. Genovese, 211 So. 2d 336, 337 (La. Ct. App. 1968), rev’d on other grounds, 223 
So. 2d 160 (1969). 
 122. Giardina , 861 F.2d at 1336 (citing LA. REV. STAT. § 28:52 (1977)). 
 123. United States v. Giardina, 861 F.2d 1334, 1334 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 124. Id. at 1336. 
 125. Id. 
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intent behind the Act. Because the Act is a criminal statute, the court 
reasoned that it must be strictly construed and the term “committed” must be 
given its “narrow meaning.”126 The court agreed with the Eight Circuit’s 
opinion in Hansel that Congress showed no intention of prohibiting 
possession by those who have merely “been hospitalized for observation and 
examination, where they were found not to be mentally ill.”127  
In 1994, in United States v. Waters,128 the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit considered whether involuntary admission constituted 
hospitalization by looking at the intent of the state legislature and attributing 
a broad congressional intent to § 922(g)(4).129 In 1979, New York 
involuntarily hospitalized defendant Waters.130 Under New York law,131 
Waters had an opportunity to receive a hearing if he requested one in writing, 
but he did not make such a request.132 Waters was in “convalescent care” for 
approximately one month.133 Sixty days after his admission, Waters 
requested that he be changed to voluntary status.134 Seven months later, the 
hospital released Waters.135 In 1991 the government indicted Waters for 
possessing firearms in violation of the Act.136 The Second Circuit held that 
the state had committed Waters within the meaning of the Act.137 The court 
followed the trend138 of deferring to state law for a definition of 
 
 
 126. Id. at 1337 (quoting Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 310 (1957)). For a discussion of 
the rule of lenity, see supra Part II.B. 
 127. 861 F.2d at 1337 (quoting United States v. Hansel, 474 F.2d 1120, 1123 (8th Cir. 1973)). The 
court then reasoned: 
 In Dickerson the Supreme Court at least indicated the need for a formal, unequivocal action 
of commitment. Temporary, emergency detentions for treatment of mental disorders or 
difficulties, which do not lead to formal commitments under state law, do not constitute the 
commitment envisioned by 18 U.S.C. § 922. An essential element of that federal offense is either 
a formal adjudication that a person suffers a mental defect, or a formal commitment, which latter, 
in the instance of Louisiana, requires formal action by the state district court.  
Id. 
 128. 23 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 129. Id. at 31-32.  
 130. United States v. Waters 23 F.3d 29, 30 (2d Cir. 1994). The state hospitalized Waters under 
section 9.27(a) of the New York Mental Hygiene Laws, which states in relevant part: “(a) The director 
of a hospital may receive and retain therein as a patient any person alleged to be mentally ill and in 
need of involuntary care and treatment upon the certificates of two examining physicians, 
accompanied by an application for the admission of such person.” N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.27(a) 
(1978). 
 131. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.31(a) (1978). 
 132. Waters, 23 F.3d at 30. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 36. 
 138. See, e.g., United States v. Giardina, 861 F.2d 1334, 1336 (5th Cir. 1988) (deferring to state 
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commitment,139 but it foreshadowed a trend to come140 when it emphasized 
the broad reach of the Act instead of focusing on the rule of lenity.141  
The court examined the history of the New York Menta l Hygiene statute 
and determined that the state legislature intended the statute to be a 
commitment statute.142 The Second Circuit noted that its conclusion was 
consistent with Hansel and Giardina.143 Even though the procedure under 
which the state hospitalized Waters would not have constituted commitment 
under Nebraska or Louisiana law, under New York law, the procedure was a 
commitment.144  
In addition, the court examined federal gun control policy. Because the 
legislative history was unhelpful,145 the court turned to the general purpose of 
the Act as interpreted by the Supreme Court.146 The court cited Huddleston 
for the proposition that Congress’s broad goal in creating the Act was to 
prevent crime by keeping guns away from those who were potentially 
dangerous.147 The court noted that the Act did not merely prohibit firearm 
 
 
law); United States v. Hansel, 474 F.2d 1120, 1123 (8th Cir. 1973) (same). 
 139. Id. at 32. 
 140. See, e.g., United States v. Chamberlain, 159 F.3d 656, 664 (1st Cir. 1998) (emphasizing that 
Congress intended to broadly prevent firearm possession by those who pose a potential risk). 
 141. 23 F.3d at 33. 
 142. Id. at 32. The court reasoned that because the state legislature continued to use the term 
“commitment” in one part of the Mental Hygiene law, the legislature intended the “admission” 
procedure under the law to be a “commitment.” Id. The fact that many New York courts have referred 
to admission under N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.27 as commitment further supports the finding that 
the legislature intended an “admission” to be a “commitment.” 23 F.3d at 33. The court also 
emphasized the procedural safeguards, such as the opportunity for a hearing, that are present in the 
New York admission system and held that these safeguards were sufficient under federal policy. Id. at 
32, 35.  
 143. Id. at 33. 
 144. Id. The court reasoned that “[i]f . . . the appellant’s detention had required, under state law, a 
judicial proceeding in order to determin e whether he was to be retained, and this had not occurred, 
then, as in Giardina and Hansel, his hospitalization would not have constituted a ‘commitment.’” Id. at 
34. Under New York law, however, the state can “commit” a person without ever holding a formal 
judicial proceeding if the patient voluntarily chooses to remain in the hospital after the sixty–day 
temporary admission period. Id. 
 145. Id. at 34. The court explained: 
The legislative history of the gun control statute states that it would be unlawful to possess a 
firearm under the statute if one has been formally committed pursuant to court order, H.R. REP. 
NO. 1577, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4410, 4421, or committed 
by a mental health board or commission in jurisdictions where these bodies “constitute the 
adjudicating or committing authority.” H.R. REP.  NO. 1956, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), 
reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4426, 4429-4430. The legislative history cited by Waters does not 
address admissions procedures into mental health facilities which, in New York State, are based 
on a medical determination of an individual’s need for hospitalization.  
Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. (citing Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 824 (1974)). 
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possession by those who had proven that they were dangerous, but also 
prohibited possession “by those with a potential for violence as well.”148 The 
court further explained that possession was prohibited by defendants under 
indictment “even though they [were] presumed innocent under the law,”149 
and by “[u]nlawful users of controlled substances, illegal aliens, and citizens 
who [had] renounced their citizenship.”150 The court noted that “[a] perusal 
of the legislative history of the statute indicate[d] that Congress would 
broadly apply the prohibition against the ownership of firearms by ‘mentally 
unstable’ or ‘irresponsible’ persons.”151 Under the Second Circuit’s 
interpretation of the Act, New York involuntarily hospitalizes only 
dangerous individuals under § 9.27, the very group Congress wants to 
prevent from possessing guns.152  
2. Towards a Federal Definition of Commitment 
In the late 1990s, the United States Courts of Appeals for the First and 
Fourth Circuits decided cases in which they parted company with their sister 
circuits. Instead of deferring to the state legislature’s definition of 
commitment, the First and Fourth Circuits sought to create a federal 
definition of commitment under the Act that was independent from the 
nuances of state law and that did not require a hearing. 
In United States v. Chamberlain ,153 the First Circuit concluded that an 
 
 
 148. 23 F.3d at 34.  
 149. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(n) (1988)). 
 150. Id. at 34-35 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(3), (g)(5), and (g)(7) (1988)). 
 151. Id. at 35 (citing 114 CONG. REC. 21,780, 21,791, 21,832, and 22,270 (1968)). 
 152. Id. The court held that Waters still presented a danger due to his continued fear of a Bureau 
of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms plot and his stockpiling of weapons. Id. In any case, the court 
explained that “Congress made no exception for subsequent curative events. The past adjudication or 
commitment disqualifies . . .  [because] such a person . . . [is] too much of a risk to be allowed firearms 
privileges.” Id. (quoting Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 116 (citations omitted)). Finally, the court noted that 
Waters had the opportunity for an administrative remedy in that he could apply for a discretionary 
waiver from § 922 (g)(4) from the Secretary of State under 18 U.S.C. § 925(c). 23 F.3d at 35. 18 
U.S.C. § 925(c) states in relevant part: 
(c) A person who is prohibited from possessing, shipping, transporting, or receiving firearms or 
ammunition may make application to the Secretary for relief from the disabilities imposed by 
Federal laws with respect to the acquisition, receipt, transfer, shipment, transportation, or 
possession of firearms, and the Secretary may grant such relief if it is established to his satisfaction 
that the circumstances regarding the disability, and the applicant's record and reputation, are such 
that the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that the 
granting of the relief would not be contrary to the public interest. Any person whose application 
for relief from disabilities is denied by the Secretary may file a petition with the United States 
district court for the district in which he resides for a judicial review of such denial.  
18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (2000). 
 153. 159 F.3d 656 (1st Cir. 1998). 
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emergency admission, without a hearing or legal representation, constituted 
commitment within the Act under a general federal definition of 
commitment.154 Maine involuntarily hospitalized defendant Chamberlain in a 
mental hospital under the state’s five-day emergency admission statute.155 
Before the five-day emergency period expired, Chamberlain voluntarily 
admitted himself and remained at the mental hospital for eight more days.156 
One year after he left the hospital, Chamberlain was arrested for possessing 
firearms.157 
 
 
 154. Id. at 665. 
 155. Id. at 657 (citing ME.  REV.  STAT.  ANN. 34-B  § 3863(1)–(3) (1988)). Two physicians 
examined Chamberlain and filed an emergency certification. A trial judge reviewed the certification 
and ordered that Chamberlain be admitted for a five day emergency detention. Upon Chamberlain’s 
arrival at the hospital, a second physician examined him. Id. at 657. 
 In relevant part, ME.  REV. STAT. ANN. 34-B § 3863(1)–(3) (1988), quoted in Chamberlain , 159 
F.3d at 666-67, provides: 
§ 3863 Emergency procedure  
 A person may be admitted to a mental hospital on an emergency basis according to the 
following procedures.  
 1. Application. Any health officer, law enforcement officer or other person may make a 
written application to admit a person to a mental hospital . . . stating:  
A. His belief that the person is mentally ill and, because of his illness, poses a likelihood of serious 
harm; and  
B. The grounds for this belief.  
2. Certifying Examination. The written application shall be accompanied by a dated certificate, 
signed by a licensed physician or a licensed clinical psychologist, stating:  
 A. The licensed physician or licensed clinical psychologist has examined the person on the 
date of the certificate; and  
. . .  
 B. He is of the opinion that the person is mentally ill and, because of his illness, poses a 
likelihood of serious harm.  
. . .  
 3. Judicial Review. The application and accompanying certificate must be reviewed by a 
Justice of the Superior Court, Judge of the District Court, Judge of Probate or a justice of the 
peace.  
. . .  
 5. Continuation of hospitalization.  
. . .  
 B. If the chief administrative officer of the hospital determines that admission of the person as 
an informally admitted patient is not suitable, or if the person declines admission as an informally 
admitted patient, the chief administrative officer of the hospital may seek involuntary commitment 
of the patient by filing an application for the issuance of an order for hospitalization under section 
3864, except that if the hospital is a designated nonstate mental health institution and if the patient 
was admitted under the contract between the hospital and the department for receipt by the 
hospital of involuntary patients, then the chief administrative officer may seek involuntary 
commitment only by requesting the commissioner to file an application for the issuance of an 
order for hospitalization under section 3864.  
Id. 
 156. Chamberlain , 159 F.3d at 657. 
 157. Id. at 658. 
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The court noted that the Act did not define commitment.158 Drawing on 
earlier cases, the court explained that the definition of “committed” was a 
federal law question, although the court could “seek guidance from state 
law.”159 The primary goal of the First Circuit’s interpretation of the term 
“committed” was to adhere to Congress’s intent in creating the Act.160 To 
discover that intent, the court surveyed Supreme Court interpretations of the 
Act in Dickerson and Huddleston161 and the legislative history of the Act.162 
The court noted that the ordinary meaning of the term “commitment” was “to 
place in or send officially to confinement . . . to consign legally to a mental 
institution.”163  
Chamberlain argued that because the Maine legislature used the term 
“commitment” in title 34-B, section 3864 of the Maine Revised Statute and 
only used the term “admission” in section 3863, the legislature did not intend 
for a section 3863 emergency admission to constitute a commitment.164 The 
court responded that the statute’s wording was vague and that Maine courts 
had sometimes used “commitment” to describe a section 3863 involuntary 
hospitalization. 165 It reasoned that even if the statute’s terminology clearly 
demonstrated that the legislature did not intend an emergency detention to be 
a commitment, the goal of national uniformity curtailed judicial deference to 
a state legislature’s wording.166 Ultimately, the court declined to follow 
Hansel and Giardina.167 The court held that whether a particular procedure 
constituted a commitment under the Act turned on the “substance” of the 
procedure, not the state legislature’s intent.168 The First Circuit’s required 
 
 
 158. Id. 
 159. United States v. Chamberlain, 159 F.3d 656, 658 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. 
Giardina, 861 F.2d 1334, 1335 (5th Cir. 1988)). 
 160. 159 F.3d at 658 (citation omitted). 
 161. Id. at 660. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 661 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD  NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1971)). 
 164. Id. at 661-62. Chamberlain argued that the state had neither applied for nor been granted an 
“involuntary commitment order.” Id. at 657. The state would have had to bring commitment 
proceedings under ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 34-B § 3863(5)(B)(2) (1988) after five days if the institution 
had wished to continue to hold Chamberlain without his voluntarily acquiescence. ME.  REV. STAT. 
ANN. 34-B § 3863(5)(B)(2) (1988), quoted in Chamberlain, 159 F.3d at 667. 
 165. United States v. Chamberlain, 159 F.3d 656, 661-62 (1st Cir. 1998). 
 166. Id. at 662. 
 167. Id. at 662-63. 
 168. Id. at 663. The court explained: 
 With all respect, we believe that the proper interpretation of the phrase, “committed to a 
mental institution,” should not turn primarily on the label attached by the state legislature to its 
procedures, but rather on the substance of those procedures. Thus, rather than focus on the 
nuances of state statutory language in interpreting “commitment,” we look at the realities of the 
state procedures and construe them in light of the purposes Congress sought to accomplish by 
prohibiting firearm possession by someone who has been “committed to a mental institution.” We 
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procedure did not include “provision of counsel, a full-blown adversary 
hearing, a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the person suffers 
from a mental illness, and a judicial order of commitment.”169 The court 
reasoned that requiring those extensive safeguards would mean that any 
commitment would also meet the adjudication as a mental defective prong of 
the Act and thus render the two-part phrase of § 922(g)(4) redundant.170 The 
court reasoned that Congress “cast a wider net” with the commitment prong 
of the Act than with the “adjudicated a mental defective” prong.171 The court 
held that the affected person did not necessarily have to suffer from a mental 
illness to be targeted by Congress under the Act—the mere danger that the 
person was mentally ill was sufficient.172  
A year after Chamberlain, in United States v. Midgett,173 the Fourth 
Circuit followed the First Circuit by looking to common usage to determine 
the definition of commitment. In 1996, a court found Midgett incompetent to 
stand trial on charges of breaking and entering and confined him to a mental 
institution. 174 The hospital psychiatrist declared Midgett delusional and 
 
 
ask whether identifying the state’s procedures for involuntary hospitalization as a “commitment” 
is reasonable and consistent with the federal policy underlying the firearms ban—namely, to keep 
firearms out of the hands of those who, if permitted to possess them, would pose a risk or potential 
for harm.  
Id.  
 169. Id. at 664. 
 170. Id. But see United States v. Hansel, 474 F.2d 1120, 1124 (8th Cir. 1973) (explaining that 
mental defectiveness is defined as arrested development or subnormal intelligence but does not include 
mental illnesses); 27 C.F.R. § 178.11 (2000) (“The term [‘committed to a mental institution’] includes 
commitment for mental defectiveness or mental illness. It also includes commitments for other 
reasons, such as for drug use.”) (emphasis added). 
 171. Chamberlain , 159 F.3d at 664. (“In denying firearms to those ‘committed to a mental 
institution,’ Congress appears to have cast a wider net —to ‘maximize the possibility of keeping 
firearms out of the hands of [persons suffering from mental illness].’ (quoting 114 CONG. REC. 21,784 
(1968) (statement of Rep. Celler)). 
 172. Id. The court explained: 
 Nor does it appear that Congress intended that only persons conclusively found to be 
suffering from mental illnesses or difficulties after having been afforded the fullest possible 
panoply of due process rights be deemed to have been “committed to a mental institution” for 
purposes of the firearms ban. That level of formality is not required for most of the categories 
Congress identified as within the firearms ban, including those who have merely been indicted a 
crime.  
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 173. 198 F.3d 143 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 174. Id. at 144. The court involuntarily hospitalized Midgett under VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2–169.2 
(Michie 1995). Id. at 144-45. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.2 states: 
 Upon finding pursuant to subsection E of § 19.2-169.1 that the defendant is incompetent, the 
court shall order that the defendant receive treatment to restore his competency on an outpatient 
basis or, if the court specifically finds that the defendant requires inpatient hospital treatment, at a 
hospital designated by the Commissioner of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Substance 
Abuse Services as appropriate for treatment of persons under criminal charge . . . . 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p359  Priest book pages.doc  8/5/2002   5:52 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
382 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 80:359 
 
 
 
 
incompetent to stand trial, but found that he was not “dangerous to himself or 
others, and [was] capable of taking care of himself.”175 Midgett pleaded nolo 
contendere and was allowed to leave the hospital and receive outpatient 
care.176 Two years later, the government charged Midgett with violating the 
Act by possessing firearms.177 The Fourth Circuit held that Midgett’s 
confinement, though not a formal commitment under Virginia law, met the 
“committed” prong of the Act.178  
The court conceded that the Virginia legislature used the term 
“commitment” to refer to a “formal civil procedure” and that the legislature 
did not use the term “commitment” in the statute under which the state 
confined Midgett.179 The court reasoned that the language of the Virginia 
statute did not bind it.180 Instead, the court employed the Chamberlain 
substantive test to determine if Virginia’s procedure constituted commitment 
under the Act.181 The court noted that in another federal statute Congress 
used the word “commit” to mean “hospitalization and treatment under 
circumstances such as these where, after a hearing, a judge finds the 
defendant mentally ill and incompetent to stand trial.”182 Furthermore, the 
court explained that, “[g]iven Midgett’s proven history of mental instability, 
he is undoubtedly in that class of persons ‘who by reason of their status, 
Congress considered too dangerous to possess guns.’”183  
 
 
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2–169.2 (Michie 1995). 
 175. Midgett, 198 F.3d at 145. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 146-47. 
 179. Id. at 146. The state involuntarily hospitalized Midgett under VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.2 
(Michie 1995). For the text of the statute see supra note 174. 
 180. Midgett, 198 F.3d at 146. (citation omitted). Under NLRB v. Natural Gas Util. Dist., 402 U.S. 
600, 603 (1971) and Yanez-Popp v. INS , 998 F.2d 231, 236 (4th Cir. 1993), in the absence of plain 
language directing application of state law, federal, not state, law governs the interpretation of the 
statute. Midgett, 198 F.3d at 145. Because § 922(g)(4) does not explicitly call for the application of 
state law—or of any law—to interpret the meaning of “committed,” “the question remains one of 
federal law.” Id. (citations omitted). Because the statute gives no definition of “committed,” the court 
applied its common usage. The court employed the dictionary definition of commitment, which is “to 
place officially in confinement or custody.” Id. at 146 (quoting AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE 
DICTIONARY  280 (3d ed. 1997)). However, the court noted that Midgett was represented by counsel 
and a judge issued an involuntary hospitalization order based on evidence, so that whatever the “outer 
parameters” of the definition of “committed,” the procedure that Midgett underwent “[fell] squarely 
within any reasonable definition of ‘committed.’” Id. at 146. (footnote omitted). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at n.4 (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 4241(d) (West 1985)). 
 183. Id. at 146 (quoting United States v. Dunford, 148 F.3d 385, 388-89 (4th Cir. 1998)).  
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F. Analagous State Law: Drafting Solutions to Ambiguity  
State gun control laws often mirror the statutory language of the Act. 
State approaches to analogous provisions offer possible solutions to the 
current disagreement in federal interpretation of the Act. In Morris v. 
Blaker,184 the Supreme Court of Washington invalidated a Washington gun 
control law that failed to allow for curative events for individuals who had 
once been confined to a mental institution. 185 The court held that the state 
gun control statute was constitutional insofar as it denied gun rights to those 
confined to a mental institution. 186 The court concluded, however, that the act 
violated equal protection of the law by denying those who had been confined 
to a mental institution the same opportunity as violent felons to regain their 
gun rights by showing subsequent curative events.187 The court went on to 
reason that, apart from the lack of opportunity for curative events, the state 
could constitutionally prevent those individuals who had been involuntarily 
committed from possessing firearms, but only because formal judicial 
commitment triggered the ban.188  
While Washington State applied a 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4)-type prohibition 
only to those who had been formally committed and allowed for curative 
events, Idaho adopted the opposite approach. After the Attorney General of 
Idaho opined that Idaho’s § 922(g)(4)-type statute was unconstitutionally 
vague, the Idaho legislature subsequently enacted legislation that specifically 
stated that merely suffering from mental illness prevents gun ownership.189 
 
 
 184. 821 P.2d 482 (Wash. 1992). 
 185. Id. at 489-90. 
 186. Id. at 489. 
 187. Id. at 489-91. 
 188. Id. The defendant argued that the ban “unconstitutionally discriminate[d] against all former 
mental patients because any disqualification of former mental patients violates equal protection.” Id. at 
491. The court refused to determine whether strict scrutiny applied, because it defined commitment 
narrowly. Id. Moreover, the court decided that the statute applied only to individuals that the state had 
confined under Washington state’s formal involuntary commitment law, WASH . REV. CODE 
§ 71.05.320. Id. The court reasoned that because the firearms prohibition only applied to those whom 
the state had formally committed, the statute passed even strict scrutiny. Id. Furthermore, Washington 
had a “compelling state interest” in public safety authorizing it to prevent firearm possession by those 
that the state has formally committed: the state has “shown by clear, cogent and convincing evidence 
to present a danger to self or others, either by aggressive or passive behavior.” Id. The court reasoned 
that such people “present a foreseeable risk” to public safety. Id. The court concluded: 
 The current statutory classification includes only those persons who have been judicially 
determined to be gravely disabled or to present a danger to themselves or others as a result of a 
mental disorder. The State has a compelling interest in keeping weapons out of the hands of 
persons who have been the subject of such a judicial determination.  
Id.  
 189. 15 Op. Idaho Att’y Gen. No. 90-3 (1990). The Attorney General of Idaho responded to the 
request of the Fremont County Sheriff as to whether IDAHO CODE  § 18-3302 was constitutional. Id. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
As explained above, the rule of lenity, adopted by the Supreme Court, 
requires that when an act is penal, a court should strictly construe the act and 
should construe any ambiguities in favor of the defendant.190 The rule of 
lenity should apply to the Act. First, the Act is a penal act.191 Second, for the 
rule of lenity to apply, an act must be ambiguous and without helpful 
legislative history.192 The Act is ambiguous, as one congressman admitted 
during the Act’s passage,193 and as the courts of appeals demonstrated with 
their various interpretations of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4).194 The Act also has 
 
 
The Attorney General concluded that the section was unconstitutionally vague. Id. The Attorney 
General asked: “What is a mental institution, and what is required to be considered to have been 
‘committed?’” Id. The Attorney General wondered whether the “stigma” of commitment was 
unending. Id. Looking to United States v. Giardina , 861 F.2d 1334 (5th Cir. 1988), the opinion noted 
that a formal commitment hearing might be required under the federal Gun Control Act. Id. It further 
noted that under Idaho law, a voluntarily patient at a mental institution has been “admitted,” while an 
involuntary patient has been “committed.” Id. (citing IDAHO CODE § 66-317(b), (c) (1990)). The 
Attorney General concluded that the Idaho legislature intended the prohibition to only apply to formal, 
court-ordered commitments. Id. 
 IDAHO CODE § 18-3302 (Supp. 2001) in relevant part now reads: 
(1) The sheriff of a county shall, within ninety (90) days after the filing of an application by any 
person who is not disqualified from possessing or receiving a firearm under state or federal law, 
issue a license to the person to carry a weapon concealed on his person within this state for four 
(4) years from the date of issue. The citizen's constitutional right to bear arms shall not be denied 
to him, unless he: . . .   
 (f) Is currently suffering or has been adjudicated as follows, based on substantial evidence:  
 (i) Lacking mental capacity as defined in section 18-210, Idaho Code; or  
 (ii) Mentally ill as defined in section 66-317, Idaho Code; or  
 (iii) Gravely disabled as defined in section 66-317, Idaho Code; or  
 (iv) An incapacitated person as defined in section 15-5-101(a), Idaho Code . . . 
Id. 
 190. See supra Part II.B. 
 191. The sanction for violating the Act is a fine and the possibility of up to ten years of prison. 18 
U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2000). The statute reads in relevant part: “Whoever knowingly violates subsection 
. . . (g) . . . of section 922 shall be fined as provided in this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or 
both.” Id . This penalty goes beyond “mere redress to an individual for injuries received,” and thus, the 
Act is a penal act. See SINGER, supra  note 50, § 59.01 at 92 (rev. 5th ed. 1992).  
 192. See id. § 59.03, at 102. 
 193. 114 CONG.  REC. 21,780 (statement of Rep. Sikes) (1968) (“[T]his bill contains serious 
weaknesses and should not be enacted in its present form. It is ambiguous, and there is no assurance 
that in its interpretation much more would not be read into the bill than ever was intended by its 
authors. It badly needs clarification, and limitations on its broad language must be spelled out . . . . 
There are many . . . areas where the bill conveys too much authority, or where it is weak and requires 
clarification.”). 
 194. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 18. As the Eighth Circuit noted in United States v.  Hansel, if 
Congress had wanted to include all people with a history of mental illness, without the requirement of 
a formal commitment, it would have indicated as much. 474 F.2d 1120, 1125 (8th Cir. 1973). The 
Idaho legislature’s solution in its gun control statute demonstrated how a statute could be written if the 
enacting body clearly wanted to prohibit gun ownership by the mentally ill, as well as by those who 
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little helpful legislative history pertaining to the definition of “committed” in 
§ 922(g)(4).195  
In addition to the common justifications for the rule of lenity,196 there are 
other factors that demonstrate that the rule of lenity is especially applicable to 
this Act. As Professor Batey points out: “The complexity [of the Gun Control 
Act of 1968] provides a wide opportunity for innovation by federal law 
enforcement officers. The potential for arbitrariness that is inherent in such 
innovation in turn demands vigilance by courts reviewing the officers’ acts. 
Strict construction is one way to maintain this vigilance.”197 Professor Batey 
further argues that strict construction of the Gun Control Act of 1968 is 
especially desirable to curb the arbitrariness of the authorities because in the 
past the government has used gun control laws “as a tool of 
discrimination.”198 If courts use strict construction in interpreting the Gun 
Control Act of 1968, they will curb the ability of authorities to use the Act to 
target minority populations.199 In the case of § 922(g)(4), gun control has the 
potential to discriminate against the mentally ill. 200 Finally, the rule of lenity 
 
 
have been formally committed. See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
 195. See United States v. Waters, 23 F.3d 29, 34 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 196. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. 
 197. Batey, Techniques, supra note 59, at  137. 
 198. Batey, Firearms Offenses, supra note 59, at  165 (footnotes omitted). 
 199. Id. 
 200. Courts have shown favor for alleged stalkers over a person who is allegedly mentally ill. The 
First Circuit held that the government could prohibit a person from possessing a firearm if he was 
involuntarily hospitalized without a hearing. United States v. Chamberlain, 159 F.3d 656, 665 (1st Cir. 
1998). Ironically, the First Circuit noted that persons subject to restraining orders for stalking are 
entitled to a hearing, among other things, before the Gun Control Act applies to them. Id. at 664-65 
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (1994)). 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2000) states, in relevant part: 
 (g) It shall be unlawful for any person— 
. . .  
 (8) who is subject to a court order that— 
 (A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual notice, and at which 
such person had an opportunity to participate; 
 (B) restrains such person from harassing, stalk ing, or threatening an intimate partner of 
such person or child of such intimate partner or person, or engaging in other conduct that 
would place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child; and 
 (C)(i) includes a findin g that such person represents a credible threat to the physical 
safety of such intimate partner or child; or 
 (ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 
force against such intimate partner or child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily 
injury;  
. . .  . 
to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any 
firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or 
transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 
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is particularly applicable to this Act because the Supreme Court has 
previously applied the rule to the Gun Control Act of 1968.201 
Interpretations of ambiguous phrases in statutes should be informed by 
the professionals who are involved in that field, by the way the term is 
actually used in practice, and by the people who are affected by the statute.202 
Authorities in the field of mental health law differentiate between “regular” 
commitment and temporary or emergency admission.203 Thus, the corollary 
of following the interpretation the experts in the field dovetails with the 
interpretation under the rule of lenity: the Act only addresses formal 
commitments. The Fourth Circuit in Midgett ignored the fact that 
commitment is a term of art in the mental health field when it simply looked 
up the verb “to commit” in the dictionary.204 Following the usage in the field 
of mental health by professionals and by patients, the courts should construe 
commitment to mean formal commitment after a hearing. 
Statutory interpretation under the rule of lenity and deference to experts in 
the subject matter aid the courts in reaching Congress’ intent. The legislative 
history of the Act, although sparse, indicates that Congress intended 
commitment under the Act to include solely formal civil commitments. The 
conference report on the Act205 demonstrates that Congress intended 
§ 922(g)(4) to only apply to people who had been judicially committed, 
unless that jurisdiction used a board or commission to play the judicial 
role.206 Thus, a formal judicial-type hearing is required to trigger § 922(g)(4). 
The representatives made various references to their desire to keep guns 
away from those who are too dangerous to possess a gun due to mental 
instability. 207 The speakers addressed the need to prevent dangerous or 
incompetent people from possessing firearms, but never mentioned people 
who were merely allegedly  incompetent.208  
Congress drafted the “committed to a mental institution” prong of the Act 
to fashion a proxy for mental incompetency in the sense of being too 
 
 
Id. 
 201. See Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 14 (1978); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 
347-49 (1971). See also discussion supra  note 60 and accompanying text.  
 202. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text. 
 203. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 204. United States v. Midgett, 198 F.3d 143, 146 (4th Cir. 1999). See supra  note 180 and 
accompanying text. 
 205. H.R. CONF.  REP. NO. 90-1956 (1968), reprinted in  1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4426, 4429-30. For 
full text see supra note 64. 
 206. Id. See supra  note 64 and accompanying text. 
 207. See statements of various congressmen supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text. 
 208. See statements of various congressmen supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text. 
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dangerous to own a gun.209 A person who is too dangerous to own a gun is 
someone who is dangerous to himself or others, which, pursuant to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in O’Connor v. Donaldson,210 is the criteria for 
formally committing a person.211 During a formal commitment hearing, the 
adjudicator seeks to determine if a person is dangerous to himself or others. 
Because of this determination, a person who has been formally committed 
has the characteristic that Congress was targeting when it drafted the 
“committed” prong of the Act. Thus, to follow Congress’s intention, courts 
should only prohibit gun possession by persons who have been formally 
committed. 
Congress inserted the commitment prong of the Act to serve as a proxy 
for dangerousness, but to include emergency or observational commitments 
within the meaning of commitment under the Act would be overbroad. 
Under O’Connor, the state must demonstrate that a person is dangerous 
before it can commit her.212 Therefore, formal commitment is a rational 
proxy for dangerousness. In contrast, one can get a temporary or emergency 
admission with relative ease.213 Because states do not have to prove 
dangerousness at an adversarial hearing for emergency and observational 
admissions, these types of hospitalization are not good proxies for 
dangerousness and thus do not further Congress’s aims.  
A requirement of a formal commitment hearing with counsel is also 
consistent with the post-enactment regulations, which require formal 
commitment.214 Although the regulatory definition of “committed to a mental 
institution” does not expressly mention emergency detention,215 emergency 
detention is not “formal” commitment,216 and thus the regulations exclude 
emergency detention from its definition of commitment. 
The Supreme Court implicitly interpreted the term “commitment” to 
mean a formal commitment. In Addington v. Texas,217 the Supreme Court 
used the term “civil commitment proceeding” to refer to a procedure that 
would result in the individual being “involuntarily confined indefinitely.”218 
 
 
 209. See statements of various congressmen supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text (stating 
intent to keep guns away from persons who are ‘unstable,’ ‘irresponsbile[],’ ‘incompetent[],’ and 
unable to use guns ‘safely and legitimately’). 
 210. 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975). 
 211. See supra note 35. 
 212. O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 575. See also supra  note 35. 
 213. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 214. 27 C.F.R. § 178.11 (2000). For statutory language see supra  text accompanying note 80. 
 215. Id. 
 216. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 217. 441 U.S. 418 (1979). 
 218. Id. at 425. The Court wrote: “In considering what standard should govern in a civil 
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Tacitly, the Court was not including temporary and emergency 
“commitments” in its definition of “civil commitment.”219 In fact, the Court 
paid extensive attention that to both the importance of due process and the 
consequences of “commitment.”220 This reliance demonstrates that the Court 
interpreted the term “commitment” to apply to the kind of long-term 
involuntary hospitalization to which it had prescribed a careful attention to 
due process rights. 
The rules of statutory construction, the legislative history of the Act, and 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the term “commitment” indicate that 
courts should read the commitment prong of the Act to require a formal 
commitment. The Second Circuit in United States v. Waters221 argued that 
the Act does not merely prohibit firearm possession by those who have 
proven that they are dangerous, but also prohibits possession “by those with a 
potential for violence as well.”222 The court noted that possession is 
prohibited by defendants under indictment “even though they are presumed 
innocent under the law.”223 But this argument is flawed. The Act prohibited a 
person from possessing a firearm while under indictment, before the person 
had been proven guilty. That prohibition was temporary, however. 
Eventually the court would find the person guilty, or the court or prosecutor 
would dismiss the charges. A person under indictment is not perpetually 
banned from gun possession because a grand jury indicted her. An 
emergency or temporary hospitalization is similar to an indictment; it is an 
intermediate step on the road to commitment, some other treatment, or no 
treatment at all. The emergency or temporary hospitalization is merely a 
temporary measure until the final outcome of the matter. If the final outcome 
is a formal civil commitment, then the Act applies.224 If the final outcome is 
something less than commitment, then the Act does not apply.225 It would be 
unfair to use a temporary stopgap measure—an emergency admission—as 
the trigger for a permanent prohibition on gun possession. 
 
 
commitment proceeding, we must assess both the extent of the individual’s interest in not being 
involuntarily confined indefinitely and the state’s interest in committing the emotionally disturbed 
under a particular standard of proof.” Id. 
 219. Temporary commitments are by definition short-term, and the Court assumed that the state 
could confine a patient “indefinitely” once it committed him or her. Addington, 441 U.S. at 425. 
 220. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. 
 221. 23 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 222. Id. at 34.  
 223. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(n) (1978)). 
 224. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (2000).  
 225. Id.  
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IV. PROPOSAL 
As the Act now stands, the courts should strictly construe the phrase 
“committed to a mental institution” in order to give effect to Congress’s 
intent and to protect the defendant under the rule of lenity. Commitment 
under the Act would entail only a formal commitment, and temporary 
involuntary hospitalizations would have only temporary effects. In the long 
term, Congress should rewrite the Act to define “committed” to include only 
those involuntary hospitalizations that entail the right to a hearing and 
counsel. Such a revision of the Act would preserve the due process rights of 
the allegedly mentally ill. Congress could substitute “person . . . who has 
been committed to a mental institution”226 with “person who has been 
adjudicated to be dangerous to themselves or others and has been judicially 
involuntarily committed to a mental institution after notice and a formal 
hearing at which the person had the assistance of counsel and the right to be 
heard.”  
If this proposal were followed, then Jane would return to her job as a 
bodyguard and the charge would be dropped,227 as it should be if the 
government is to abide by the Supreme Court’s warning in Addington:  
At one time or another every person exhibits some abnormal behavior 
which might be perceived by some as symptomatic of a mental or 
emotional disorder, but which is in fact within a range of conduct that 
is generally acceptable. Obviously, such behavior is no basis for 
compelled treatment and surely none for confinement . . . . Loss of 
liberty calls for a showing that the individual suffers from something 
more serious than is demonstrated by idiosyncratic behavior.228  
Clare Priest* 
 
 
 226. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (2000). 
 227. Under the proposed revision, Jane would be allowed to return to work. The revision requires 
a formal hearing, a finding of dangerousness, and the assistance of counsel. Jane was hospitalized 
without a hearing, without a finding of dangerousness, and without opportunity to have the assistance 
of counsel. See text supra Part I. If the examining physician had determined that Jane was a danger to 
herself or others, then the physician could have begun the formal commitment process. Had Jane been 
dangerous to herself or to others, then the court would have formally civilly committed her, and under 
the revised Act, she would have been unable to possess a firearm.  
 228. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426-27 (1979). 
 * B.A. (1999), Columbia University; J.D. (2002), Washington University School of Law. 
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